As my students and I contemplate “time” this week in the writings of Augustine, I’ve been re-visiting the connections between Augustine and Beckett on the notion of time, the origin of creative activity, and the relationship between memory and the narrative imperative. In a conversation earlier today with John Emigh about “time” in Beckett’s “Waiting for Godot,” he reminded me of the passage below by John Donne:
What poor elements are our happinesses made of, if time, time which we can scarce consider to be any thing, be an essential part of our happiness! All things are done in some place; but if we consider place to be no more but the next hollow superficies of the air, alas! how thin and fluid a thing is air, and how thin a film is a superficies, and a superficies of air! All things are done in time too, but if we consider time to be but the measure of motion, and howsoever it may seem to have three stations, past, present, and future, yet the first and last of these are not (one is not now, and the other is not yet), and that which you call present, is not now the same that it was when you began to call it so in this line (before you sound that word present, or that monosyllable now, the present and the now is past). If this imaginary, half-nothing time, be of the essence of our happinesses, how can they be thought durable? Time is not so; how can they be thought to be? Time is not so; not so considered in any of the parts thereof…
